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Abstract
How do voters react to large shocks that are (mostly) outside the control of politicians? 
We address this question by studying the electoral effects of wildfi res in Spain during 
1983-2011. Using a difference-in-difference strategy, we fi nd that a large accidental fi re 
up to nine months ahead of a local election increases the incumbent party’s vote share 
by almost 8 percentage points. We fi nd that a rally-behind-the-leader effect best explains 
the results. A simple formalization of this mechanism yields an implication – that the effect 
should be larger for stronger (more voted) incumbents – that is supported by the data.
Keywords: voting behavior, rally behind the leader, difference-in-differences.
JEL classifi cation: D72, D91.
Resumen
¿Cómo reaccionan los votantes ante shocks que están (en su mayor parte) fuera del control 
de los políticos? Este artículo aborda esta cuestión a través del estudio de las consecuencias 
electorales de los incendios forestales en España en el período 1983-2011. A través de una 
estrategia de diferencias en diferencias, encontramos que un incendio forestal accidental y 
de gran tamaño producido hasta nueve meses antes de unas elecciones locales aumenta el 
porcentaje de votos del partido en la alcaldía en hasta ocho puntos porcentuales. También 
encontramos que la explicación más coherente con los resultados es un movimiento de apoyo 
al líder «rally behind the leader». Además, una formalización simple de este mecanismo tiene 
una implicación, que el efecto debería ser mayor para los alcaldes más votados, que es 
corroborada en los datos.
Palabras clave: comportamiento electoral, movimiento de apoyo al líder, diferencias en 
diferencias.
Códigos JEL: D72, D91.
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1 Introduction
How do voters react to large shocks that are (mostly) outside the control of the incumbent? This is
a crucial question to understand and model voting behavior. Accordingly, it has attracted a lot of
attention in the political economy literature (Achen and Bartels (2016), Bagues and Esteve-Volart
(2016)). However, no consensus has emerged yet with respect to both the electoral impact of these
shocks and the mechanisms behind the response of voters.
In this paper, we study how an accidental fire affects the incumbent’s vote share at elections
in Spain. Our results show that a fire in the last months before a local election increases the vote
share of the incumbent party. This finding goes against most of the previous literature, which finds
that bad shocks decrease the incumbent’s vote share.
We exploit a unique dataset that contains data from all wildfires in Spain from 1983 to 2014.
This dataset is well suited to address our research question. First, we can identify the dates of
detection and extinctions of fires. Second, we know the surface burnt by municipality. This allows
us to have a precise measure of how much a given municipality was affected by the fire. We focus
on large fires, as we want to study the response of voters to sizable shocks. Our “benchmark” is to
study the effect of fires that burns at least 1% of the municipality’s surface area—on average, 195
hectares—and we analyze the effects of fires of a wide range of sizes.1 Third, we can identify the
cause of the fire. To reduce endogeneity concerns as much as possible, we focus on accidental (as
opposed to intentional) fires, caused by either negligence or thunderbolts.
We follow a difference-in-difference estimation strategy, and discuss in detail its validity. Identi-
fication relies on the assumption that in a given province-term, having a large accidental fire is not
correlated with other factors that affect the incumbent’s vote share. We argue that our empirical
strategy is likely to uncover the true ballot effects of large fires for five reasons. First, we focus on
accidental fires, which have a large component of randomness, and therefore they are less likely to
be correlated with other unobservable variables determining the incumbent political fortunes. Still,
one might worry that, even though we focus on accidental fires, mayors could affect the probability
of fire in the municipality (e.g. through prevention policies). Second, we show that the results
are robust to a battery of fixed effects, ranging from province-year to municipality dummies, and
including a combination of those. This accounts for possible omitted variables that do not change
within province-term or within municipalities over time. Third, we show that accidental fires are
not correlated with economic conditions or with past vote shares, which provides evidence of their
true random nature. Fourth, we note that any remaining bias is likely to be downwards, i.e. it
would go against finding a positive effect of wildfires, since more able mayors are more likely to re-
duce the odds of a fire and to receive a larger vote share for reasons unrelated to fires. And fifth, we
consider an alternative specification that relies on a milder identification assumption. Specifically,
this assumption asserts that although mayors might affect the likelihood of accidental happening,
they cannot control their precise timing. We compare municipalities with a fire early in the term
with those experiencing such an event in the months close to the election. The results from this
strategy reinforce the findings from the baseline. Hence, any remaining concern about identification
is unlikely to explain the differential effects of fires by time to election.
1One hectare is equal to 100 x 100 squared meters, that is, roughly one soccer stadium.
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We argue that the results are driven by a “rally” effect. By this, we mean that a fire increases
voters’ preferences to support the government, regardless of which party is in office and of the
response of the government. The literature has found evidence on rallies after international crises
or terrorist attacks. Our evidence suggests that natural disasters can generate similar effects.
This is, to some extent, unsurprising, given that they share many of the key characteristics of
international crises and terrorist attacks that facilitate the existence of rallies—they are dramatic,
specific, and sudden (Mueller (1973)).
To formalize the mechanism, we develop a simple extension of the canonical model of prob-
abilistic voting (Persson and Tabellini (2002), chapter 3.4). According to previous work, a rally
translates into an increase in popularity or approval rate of the government. However, the literature
does not explicitly discuss how it affects the behavior of voters when they face an election: voters
would like to support the government that comes out of the polls, but cannot know ex ante which
party is going to form the government. Hence, we model a rally in elections as an increase in the
utility that voters derive from voting for the party that they believe will form the government. In
the model, there are two parties, A and B. Suppose that party A is stronger, meaning that more
voters ideologically prefer party A to party B, and that voters know this (in an appendix we provide
an alternative model in which voters are uncertain about the strength of parties and update their
priors based on the previous election’s vote shares). Voting is probabilistic—hence, in some cases,
the weaker party will win the election. If there is no fire, voters vote for their ideologically preferred
party. If there is a fire, voters derive some utility from voting for the expected winner, as in Callan-
der (2007). Hence, in case of a fire, bandwagon behavior arises, as voters rally behind the expected
government. In the example, some voters (those which are sufficiently close to the indifference in
ideology) will vote for party A even if they ideologically prefer party B, because they believe that
party A will win the election. The model yields two main predictions. First, a fire increases the vote
share of the incumbent. The intuition is simple—given that party A is the stronger party in the
municipality, the incumbent is more likely to be of party A. That is, the incumbent is more likely
to win the next election than the challenger, and hence a rally behind the expected winner benefits
the incumbent, on average. And second, the model yields an additional testable prediction: that
the effect of a fire on the incumbent’s vote share is increasing in the incumbent’s vote share in the
previous election. In other words, more voted incumbents (those that won, for example, by 70-30)
should benefit more from a fire than less voted incumbents (e.g those that won by 52-48). The
intuition is that the share of party A incumbents is increasing in the incumbent’s vote share in the
previous election. That is, among weak incumbents, there are many cases in which the incumbent
is of party B and, therefore, not very likely to win the next election. In those cases, the rally will
not favor the incumbent and, on average, the effect on the incumbent’s vote share will be small.
Strong incumbents are, however, overwhelmingly of party A and therefore most of them will benefit
from the rally, hence creating a large effect of a fire. We find strong evidence for this additional
prediction.
While we cannot provide a direct test of this mechanism, it is the most consistent with the
available evidence. First, it can naturally explain why the effect of a fire on the incumbent’s
vote share is positive. Second, it can explain why the effect is larger for stronger incumbents,
while alternative mechanisms cannot easily account for this observed heterogeneity. Third, this
mechanism provides a compelling argument for why only fires close to the election increase the
incumbent’s vote share. The reason is that rallies are temporary—they only last while the triggering
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event remains a salient issue. For example, the duration of three rallies examined by Hetherington
and Nelson (2003) was 8, 10, and 14 months, which approximately coincides with the timing that
we find in this paper.2 Fourth, it can explain why a fire increases the votes for the party of the
local government but not for those at the regional or national governments. The main theory
about rallies argues that they are a psychological phenomenon—they arise as a consequence of
a patriotic reflex to support the government of the affected area. In rallies due to international
events or terrorism, it is the whole nation that it is in crisis, and therefore citizens rally behind
the national government—hence the expression “rally round the flag”. Fires, by contrast, affect
one municipality in particular, and therefore voters will rally behind the local government of that
municipality.
We also discuss in depth other possible mechanisms. The two main theories on voters’ response
to shocks—blind retrospection (Achen and Bartels (2016)) and “rational updating” (Ashworth,
De Mesquita, and Friedenberg (2017))—cannot fully explain our results. According to the former,
voters compare their well-being at the beginning and at the end of the term, and are irrational—
they punish (reward) the incumbent if their well-being decreased (increased) even if it was due
to events outside the control of the incumbent. Hence, only if large fires were a positive shock
to the municipality, blind retrospection could rationalize the positive effects of wildfires on the
incumbent’s vote share. We analyze two reasons why fires could be a positive shock. First, the
affected municipality might receive aid after the fire, this aid offsetting the negative effects of the
fire. However, aid is approved by national or regional governments, not local governments, so it is
not obvious why it is local governments who gain votes. Furthermore, we have gathered data on
national aid and show that: a) aid is not very common, b) aid takes time to be approved, so many
of the fires that are close to the election and benefit the incumbent have not received any aid by
election day, and c) there is no evidence that municipalities receive more aid in election years, so
this cannot explain the differential effect by time to election. Second, the local government might
use the fire to rezone the burnt land to urban or developable land, and this could in term generate
a wealth effect through the increase in land value. We use data from land use and rule out that
this happens.
According to the “rational updating” theory, recently formalized in a model by Ashworth,
De Mesquita, and Friedenberg (2017), it can be rational for voters to change their voting behavior
after a shock, even if it was due to events that are outside the control of the incumbent. The
argument is that the shock can help reveal (or mute) the quality of the incumbent, for example,
through the response given to the disaster. There are four reasons why this theory cannot fully
explain our findings. First, most of the competences on prevention and extinction are at the regional
and national levels. Although mayors also have some role in the management of the crises, especially
as representative leaders of municipalities, there is no reason to think that the quality of regional
2These were rallies in the US after the Cuban missile crisis, the Operation Desert Storm, and the September 11
attacks, respectively.
or national governments should be revealed less than that of local governments—if anything, the
opposite should be true. Hence, if the effect is driven by a “revealing-the-quality” argument, it
is not obvious why there is an effect on local elections but not on regional or national elections.
Second, this mechanism cannot explain why only fires close to the election matter—the quality of
the incumbent should be revealed (or muted) no matter when the fire happens. Third, while the
model by Ashworth, De Mesquita, and Friedenberg (2017) is general enough to allow for either a
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positive or a negative effect o a shock on the incumbent’s vote share, we believe that the more
reasonable assumptions in the model would lead to a negative effect. Fourth, it is not obvious how
such a model would explain that stronger incumbents gain more votes than weaker incumbents.
Finally, we discuss and rule out two other possible mechanisms. First, fires may change partisan
preferences of voters. For example, suppose that voters become more concerned with environmental
issues and favor left-wing parties more after a fire. If most local governments are left-wing, then
that could explain why incumbents gain, on average, vote share after a fire. Against this possible
mechanism, we show that there is no effect of a fire on the vote share for the two main parties
in Spain. We also show that incumbents of both parties gain votes after a fire. Second, fires
may make voters more willing to have their local government ideologically aligned with upper-level
(regional or national) governments. If most local governments are aligned, then that could explain
the incumbent’s vote share increase after a fire. We show, however, that there is no effect of a
fire on the party that is aligned with the regional (or national) government. We also show that
incumbents that are aligned with upper-level governments enjoy a similar boost than those that
are not.
This paper contributes to the growing literature on how voters react to natural disasters. One
of the best-known papers is Achen and Bartels (2004), which shows that voters punish incumbents
after shark attacks, droughts, and floods.3 In a recent book, Achen and Bartels (2016) summarize
those findings and discuss in detail the theory of “blind retrospection”. Heersink, Peterson, and
Jenkins (2017) find support for Achen and Bartel’s thesis, providing evidence that voters widely
punished Herbert Hoover at the polls after a catastrophic flooding in the American South in 1927.
Similarly, Cole, Healy, and Werker (2012) show that voters punish the incumbent in state elections
after catastrophic rainfall in India. Healy, Malhotra, et al. (2010) find that voters punish the
incumbent party in presidential elections for economic damage resulting from tornadoes. However,
they provide evidence that is more consistent with voters rationally evaluating government’s per-
formance: the incumbent party only appears to lose votes when no disaster declaration takes place
in response to the tornado. Similarly, Gasper and Reeves (2011) find that electorates punish presi-
dents and governors for severe weather damage but that the effects are dwarfed by the response of
attentive electorates to the actions of their officials. Fair, Kuhn, Malhotra, Shapiro, et al. (2017)
find that the 2010–2011 floods in Pakistan increased turnout but did not have an effect on the in-
cumbent’s vote share. Finally, in one of the pioneer works of this literature, Abney and Hill (1966)
studied the effects of a hurricane that struck Louisiana in 1965, and found that it did not have
3Fowler and Hall (2018), however, have questioned the causality of the shark attacks findings.
an effect on the next election. Our results therefore go in the opposite direction to most previous
work, as we find that a natural disaster increases the vote share of the incumbent party. A few
papers have indeed found similar effects, but in all these cases it has been through the aid response
to the disaster, which we show is unlikely to occur in our case. Bechtel and Hainmueller (2011)
find that the aid response to the Elbe flooding in 2002 increased vote shares for the incumbent in
subsequent elections. Chen (2013) shows that hurricane disaster aid awards in Florida increased
the incumbent party vote share. Healy and Malhotra (2009) find that voters reward the incumbent
presidential party for delivering disaster relief spending in the US.
Our paper is also related to the work that studies the response of voters to exogenous changes in
economic conditions. Bagues and Esteve-Volart (2016) study the effect of good economic conditions
on voters’ behavior exploiting the evidence from the Spanish Christmas lottery. They find that
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incumbents receive more votes in prize-awarded provinces. This is consistent with Achen and
Bartel’s theory—the well-being of voters increase and they reward the incumbent, even if the
change was due to events outside the control of the incumbent. Leigh (2009) compares the effect
of world growth (more related to luck) and national growth relative to world growth (more related
to competence). He finds that luck matters more than competence, which is also consistent with
a theory of irrational voters. Wolfers (2002) shows that voters in oil-producing states tend to
re-elect incumbent governors during oil price rises, and vote them out of office when the oil price
drops. He concludes that voters are at best characterized as “quasi-rational”. Although the nature
of these shocks is a bit different to ours (economic versus natural disasters), our findings are not
easily reconciled with this literature—since it finds that a negative shock is bad (or neutral) for the
incumbent, while we find the opposite.
Finally, this paper speaks to the literature on bandwagon behavior. This literature has provided
several cases in which voters have a preference to vote for the winner (Bischoff and Egbert (2013),
Callander (2007), Hong and Konrad (1998), Morton and Ou (2015)). The mechanism outlined in
this paper suggests that natural disasters can increase this type of behavior. Furthermore, the
model shows two novel results on the consequences of bandwagon behavior: that an increase in
bandwagon behavior will benefit incumbents, and that stronger incumbents will benefit more.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the data and the
institutional framework of fires and elections in Spain. Section 3 presents the empirical strategy.
The main results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the mechanisms. Section 6
concludes.
2 Data and Institutional Framework
2.1 Wildfires in Spain
Dry hot weather conditions and strong winds make Spain, along with the rest of Southern Europe,
prone to suffer from wildfires. For instance, in the period 1983-2014, there have been more than
8,000 wildfires affecting at least 100 ha in Spain, which have burned roughly 7% of the country’s
total surface area. Moreover, at least 3,000 municipalities have suffered this event at least once.
In Spain, the competences on prevention and extinction of wildfires are shared by the three layers
of government (local, regional, and national), the bulk of the responsibility falling onto the regional
administration. Local governments are involved mainly on prevention tasks, such as controlling
some activities prone to ignition, setting the reforestation policy, authorizing scrub burning, etc.
Regarding extinction, local governments handle only small fires, mainly through volunteers. Large
fires, which are the focus of our paper, are dealt with by the regional government in cooperation
with the national government, if the latter is required.4
4Once a fire is detected, officials of the regional government must classify it into one of four levels. Level 0 fires
are those that pose no threat to people beyond those engaged in their extinction and whose damage is expected to
be small. These fires are put off either by volunteers of the local government or by regional firemen. Level 1 fires
are those that require measures to protect people and goods threatened by the fire. The extinction of these fires is
managed by officials of the regional government. If the extinction of the fire requires national resources, then the
regional government can ask for them, declaring the fire to be of level 2. In this case, the regional government heads
a team of regional and national officials that manages the fire. Finally, the Ministry of Domestic Affairs can declare
a fire to be of “national interest”, thereby the state government heads the team acting to stop the fire. It must be
noted that no fire in Spain has ever reached level 3.
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We exploit a dataset that contains micro data on all forest fires that happened in Spain during
the period 1983–2014. These data, provided by the Ministry of Agriculture, Fishing, Food, and
Environment, stem from the reports that a local specialist must fill in after every fire. There are four
reasons why this dataset is very well suited to our purposes. First, it is made up from administrative
records and it covers the population of events during a long period of time. Second, the day of each
fire’s detection (and extinction) is precisely recorded. Third, it provides the surface area burned by
every fire by municipality. Hence, we can have a measure of how much a municipality was affected
by any given fire. Because we want to study the response of voters to sizable shocks, we focus on
large fires. In our baseline specification we study the effects of wildfires burning at least 1% of the
municipality’s surface area—these fires burned approximately 200 ha on average.5 And fourth, the
reports provide the cause of each fire, which allows us to restrict the analysis to accidental wildfires.
As we discuss below, this is especially important since intentional fires can obey to motivations that
could independently affect the electoral outcomes, such as economic conditions.6 A fire is labeled
as intentional if it was the perpetrator’s motivation to set the forest on fire, and it is tagged as
accidental otherwise. Accidental fires can have two origins: thunderbolts and negligence. Fires
among the latter are usually provoked by small burnings of stubble that go out of control and
extend to the forest, as well as by bonfires, smokers, burning of waste, etc.
5Fires burning at least 1% of a municipality’s surface area have large disruptive effects. On average, they require
130 people, 3 airplanes or helicopters, and 9 other physical units (e.g. bulldozers) to be extinguished. 14% require
roadblocks or the evacuation of people. The estimated direct losses were close to half million euros for the average
fire, according to the fire reports.
6Among fires that burn at least 1% of the municipality’s surface area, 29% are random, 44% are intentional, and
27% of unknown origin.
2.2 Elections in Spain
Local elections are held simultaneously in all municipalities every four years. Mayors are chosen
according to a “parliamentary” system: voters elect a city council on the election day and then the
city council elects the mayor among its members in the first meeting after the election.7 Our focus
in on the electoral results of the party of the mayor in office, i.e. the incumbent party.
We also study the effect of fires on regional and national elections. There are 17 regions in
Spain, and each elects a regional parliament in elections every four years. Parliaments then elect
the president of the region.8 The same pattern applies to elections for the national Congress—it is
elected every four years (although the Prime Minister can call an early election) and the Congress
then elects the prime minister. In both regional and national elections, our attention is how the
vote share for the party of the regional president or the prime minister, i.e. the incumbent party,
evolves in any given municipality after a fire strikes.
For local and national elections, the data are from the Ministry of Domestic Affairs. For regional
elections, we have collected the data from the webpages of the regional governments.9 All the data
are publicly available.
7The election for city council follows a single-district, proportional representation system, with a number of seats
that is increasing in the population size of the municipality. Municipalities with 250 inhabitants or fewer follow a
different system, namely, an open list, plurality-at-large system.
8Regional elections are held on the same day as local elections in 13 regions. The four other regions—Andalusia,
the Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia—hold their regional elections on different days.
9Unfortunately, we have some missing data for regional elections as some of the regions do not provide the data—
Aragon, Balearic Islands, Canary Islands, Extremadura, Galicia, Murcia, and Valencian Community (until 1995).
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3 Empirical Strategy
Our goal is to estimate the effect of an accidental fire on the incumbent’s vote share in the following
election. We consider this estimating equation:
ΔIncV oteShareit = αSM,pt + βSMFireSM,it + SM,it, (1)
where ΔIncV oteShareit is the difference in votes for the incumbent party between the election
at year t and the previous election (at t − 4), FireSM,it is a dummy variable that takes the value
of 1 if there has been (at least) one fire burning more than S hectares in the last M months
of the term, αpt is a province-year fixed effect, i ∈ {1, 2, ..., 8117} denotes a municipality, and
t ∈ {1987, 1991, ..., 2011} denotes an election-year. That is, we consider one separate regression
for each combination of surface area S and months to election M . Additionally, to assess the
robustness of the results, we see how they change when we add some controls and include other
fixed effects (e.g., municipality or party-province-year fixed effects). We cluster the standard errors
by municipality.10
10By doing so, we control for possible autocorrelation of the error term within municipalities over time. One could
be concerned that, if fires are spatially correlated, there is some autocorrelation also at some larger level. In the
Appendix, we show that clustering the standard errors by province does not change the results.
The identification assumption is that, in a given province-year, having a large accidental fire is
not correlated with other factors that affect the change in votes for the incumbent. In particular,
one may be concerned that mayor’s ability is correlated with having a fire during the term, and
also with her votes in the next election. We now discuss in detail the validity of this assumption.
First, recall that we focus on accidental fires, which are due to negligence or thunderbolts.
These fires therefore have a large component of randomness and are naturally less likely to be
correlated with other factors that affect the incumbent’s votes. In particular, fires caused by
property speculators trying to build in forest land or by ranchers aiming to create pasture areas,
which may correlate with economic conditions, are excluded, as they are intentional. Still, even
though we focus on accidental fires, one may still worry that mayors could affect the probability of
an accidental fire happening in the municipality. For example, she could do awareness campaigns
to prevent negligence, or she could put more resources into cleaning the forest so that fires cannot
grow fast. The remaining points address this concern.
Second, we show that the results are robust to a battery of fixed effects, ranging from province-
year to municipality dummies, as well as a combination of those. This accounts for possible omitted
variables that do not change within province-term or within municipalities over time. For example,
if municipalities with a drier weather have more fires and, for some reason, tend also to vote more
for the incumbent, that is captured by the municipality fixed effects.
Third, we provide evidence that, once the fixed effects are included, accidental fires do seem to
be exogenous. In particular, we show that accidental fires are not correlated with economic condi-
tions (unemployment rate, population size) or with past vote shares. For example, municipalities
undergoing a reduction in their unemployment rate are not more or less likely to have a fire than
those in which unemployment is increasing.
Fourth, we note that any remaining bias is likely to be downwards, i.e. it would go against
finding a positive effect of wildfires. This is because more able mayors are more likely to reduce the
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odds of a fire and to receive a larger vote share for reasons unrelated to fires. One possible caveat
is that, if mayors “know” that experiencing a fire is good for them at the next election, then more
able mayors could “attempt” to have more fires. Note, however, that there is no evidence that
there are more fires in the last months before an election, when fires have an effect, as we explain
below.11
And fifth, we consider an alternative specification that relies on a milder identification assump-
tion. This assumption asserts that, although mayors might affect the likelihood of an accidental
fire happening, they cannot control its precise timing during the term. Specifically, we estimate the
following equation:
ΔIncV oteShareit = αSM,pt + β1SMFireSM,it + β2SMFireS48,it + ψSM,it, (2)
11Also, note that, even under this hypothesis, the “true” effect would be positive (but larger than the estimated
one). The only case in which the true effect is negative but our estimate is positive is that mayors wrongly believe
that a fire will benefit them in the next election.
where Fire48,it takes the value of one if the municipality suffered from (at least) one accidental
fire burning at least S hectares in the last 48 months before the election, that is, at any point
during the term. The coefficient β1 therefore captures the differential effect of a fire in the last M
months of the term, relative to the effect of a fire earlier in the term. Suppose that conditional
mean independence holds, that is:
E(ψ|FireM , F ire48) = E(ψ|FireM ), (3)
where ψ is the error term in Equation 2—for example, the ability of the mayor. Under this
assumption, the estimate of β1 is consistent even if that of β2 is not. Intuitively, this condition
establishes that mayors might influence the probability of a fire during the term, but cannot exert
precise control on the timing of accidental fires. Hence, β2 is consistently estimated under a milder
assumption than β in Equation (1). We will show that the results from this strategy reinforce the
findings from the baseline. Hence, any remaining concern about identification is unlikely to explain
the differential effects of fires by time to election.12
In Panel A of Table 1, we show the mean and standard deviation of the main variables used in
the paper, averaged by municipality. The first column considers the full sample, the second column
only municipalities that have had at least one fire of size S = 1% (at any point), and the third
column only municipalities that have had at least one fire of size S = 1% in the last 6 months
before a local election (M = 6). These summary statistics indicate that municipalities that are
affected by wildfires are similar to the average Spanish municipality. Appendix Figure A1 shows a
map with the distribution of fires over Spain.
In Panel B of Table 1, we show the number of observations with FireSM,it = 1, for different
values of S and M . For example, there are 665 observations with (at least) one accidental fire that
burned at least 1% of the municipality’s surface area in the last 12 months before a local election.
12A possible concern would be that mayors could somehow induce different probabilities of having a fire at different
points of the term, and that more able mayors are better able to do so. Given that, if anything, there seem to be
fewer fires at the end of the term (Table 1), it seems that mayors avoid having fires at the end of the term. Then,
Corr(FireSM,it, ψit|FireS48,it) < 0, i.e., conditional on the number of fires during the term, more able mayors have
fewer fires towards the end. This would generate a downwards bias in βˆ1. That is, the true value of the differential
effect would be even larger in magnitude.
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In the last 6 months, there are 58. Hence, the number of fires is proportionally much lower in the
last 6 than in the last 12 months before an election. This is because local elections take place in
May or June—hence, the last 6 months cover the winter, when fires are less likely. To study if
there are more fires right before an election, in the right-hand side of the table we show the number
of observations with FireSM,it = 1, but focusing on the same calendar months of the year. As
mentioned, there are 58 fires in the last 6 months before an election, that is, between January and
May or June of the election-year, for size S = 1%. Between 18 and 12 months before an election,
that is, between January and May or June of the previous year, there are 87 observations with a
fire. Between 24 and 30 months (36 and 42), there are 96 (69). Hence, there is no evidence that
municipalities experience more fires in the last months before an election—if anything, there seems
to be fewer fires. This addresses the possible identification concern that politicians anticipate the
beneficial effects of a fire close to the election, thus leading to more fires in those months.
4 Results
4.1 Main results
We begin by studying the effect of fires on local elections. We estimate Equation (1) for different
combinations of burned surface area (S) and months before the election (M). Figure 1 shows the
results for different values of M in the x-axis, fixing the size of the fire at S = 1% (195 ha, on
average). The dots are the estimated βs, and the lines are 95% confidence intervals. The results
indicate that there is no effect of fires 11 months or more before the election. The effect steadily
increases from that point on, reaching 5 p.p. at M = 4 months. The estimates to the right of the
vertical line are placebo tests that show the “effect” of fires that happen after the election. They
are all very close to zero and insignificant, lending credibility to the empirical approach. Panel A
of Table 2 shows the corresponding estimates and standard errors. The effect at 6 months before
the election is 4.2 p.p. and significant at the 1% level. This effect is large quantitatively: it is
equivalent to approximately one fourth of the standard deviation of the dependent variable and,
given that the mean incumbent vote share is 58%, it is equivalent to a 7.2% effect (4.2/58).
Figure 2 does the opposite: it fixes the time to election atM = 6 months, and considers different
sizes of fires in the x-axis. When smaller fires are included, there is little or no effect on the votes
for the incumbent. The effect increases steadily up to fires burning at least 1.5%, and then flattens
out at an effect of approximately 8 p.p. Panel B of Table 2 displays the corresponding coefficients.
The effects are significant at the 1% level for fires burning from at least 1% to at least 3% of the
surface area. Significance decreases from that point due to larger standard errors: fires burning at
least 5% of the surface area are significant at the 10% level.13
We next study the effects of wildfires on regional and national elections, following the same
empirical strategy. In the first row of Table 3, we show the effects of a fire that burns at least 1%
of the municipality’s surface area in the last 6 months before the election, for local (column 1),
regional (column 2), and national elections (column 3). As we know, the effect on local elections
is 4.2 p.p. and significant at the 1% level. The effect on regional and national elections, although
13In Appendix Figures A2 and A3, we show that the results are very similar when, instead of defining the size of
a fire as a fraction of the surface of the municipality, we define it in absolute size or as a fraction of population size.
Appendix Figure A4 shows that the results remain significant when clustering the standard error by province.
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also positive, is much smaller (0.7 and 0.26 p.p., respectively) and not statistically significant. The
same pattern arises when we focus on larger fires that burn at least 2% of the municipality’s surface
area—see the results on the second row of Table 3. That is, although most of the competences
regarding fires are at the regional and national levels, rather than at the local level, we find that
the elections outcomes only change at the local level. We interpret this as evidence against a
“revealing-the-quality” argument and in favor of a rally effect, as we discuss in the next section.
4.2 Robustness
Here we assess the robustness of the finding that fires increase the incumbent’s vote share in local
elections.
Different fixed effects and controls. First of all, we analyze whether the results are robust
to different specifications. Table 4 fixes both the size of the fire S = 1% and the months to the
election M = 6, and studies the robustness of the results. The first column is the benchmark result,
and therefore coincides with the one presented above. The second adds controls for unemployment
and population size. The last four columns consider different combinations of fixed effects, there-
fore exploiting different sources of variation: province and year fixed effects separately (αp + αt),
municipality and year fixed effects (αm + αt), both province-year and municipality fixed effects
(αpt + αm), and party-province-year fixed effects (αrpt). The results are quantitatively similar
across all specifications and significant at least at the 5% level.
Placebo tests. To examine the exogeneity of accidental fires, we do two sets of placebo tests.
The intuition behind these tests is that if, after including the fixed effects, accidental fires are truly
exogenous, then the variable FireSM,it should not be correlated with past conditions—in particular,
with lagged values of the outcome and of economic variables.
First, we estimate how fires that happen after the election affect the election results. If the
identification strategy is valid and accidental fires are exogenous, then there should be no correlation
between the change in votes for the incumbent and experiencing a large accidental fire in the next
term, so γ = 0. However, if mayors that are becoming stronger can somehow avoid fires during
the term, then γ < 0. In the main results in Figure 1, we have already shown that fires up to 12
months after the election do not have any effect. Here we show further tests on the same line. In
particular, we estimate:
ΔIncV oteShareit−4 = αSM,pt + γSMFireSM,it + ηSM,it−4, (4)
where ΔIncV oteShareit−4 is the change in the votes for the incumbent in the previous election
(that is, the change in votes from t-8 to t-4) and γ serves as a placebo test. Hence, we test
how a fire in the M months before an election affects the previous election results.14 The results
are displayed in Table 5 and represented graphically in Appendix Figure A5. No coefficient is
statistically different from zero, even at the 10% level, providing assurance about the validity of
the empirical strategy.
14That is, the placebos in Figure 1 show how fires in the, for example, three months after an election affect that
election’s results. Here we estimate how fires that happen, for example, three months before an election, affect the
previous election’s results—or, equivalently, how fires that happen between 3 years and 9 months and 4 years after
an election affect that election’s results.
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Second, we do placebo tests to see if fires can be explained by the economic conditions. In
particular, we estimate
UnemRateit − UnemRateit−j = αSM,pt + ζSMFireSM,it + θSM,it, (5)
for different values of j (j ∈ 1, 2, 5). For example, if j = 2, we test whether a fire of size S in the last
M months of the term correlates with the unemployment rate change in the last two years before
the election. If accidental fires are exogenous, then we expect ζ = 0. If, for example, more economic
activity increases the probability of fire—for example, people do more barbecues outdoors—then
ζ < 0. The results from these tests are displayed in Panel A of Table 6. All of the coefficients
are close to zero and insignificant. Panel B does the same test for (log) population size instead of
unemployment. Again, no coefficient is statistically different from zero at conventional levels.
Alternative specification. In Table 7, we show the results of the alternative specification
given by Equation (2), for different combinations of M (Panel A) and S (Panel B). Recall that the
coefficients β1SM capture the differential effect of a fire in the last M months before the election
relative to earlier (from 48 to M months) fires. The estimated coefficients, shown in the first row
of the two panels, are positive and significant for fires in the last 9 months before the election and
burning at least 1% of the surface area (or larger). The coefficients β2SM capture the effect of
earlier fires. Their estimated values are in the second row of the two panels, and are close to zero
and not statistically significant at the 5% level for any combination of S and M .
5 Mechanisms
In this section we discuss several mechanisms that may drive the results presented so far. We
argue that a rally-behind-the-leader effect is the most consistent with the evidence. We start
by discussing this mechanism, which we illustrate with a simple model. We then consider other
possible mechanisms: blind retrospection, rational updating, and explanations based on partisan
preferences and preferences for alignment. We provide several arguments that indicate that these
alternative mechanisms do not drive the results.
5.1 Rally
5.1.1 Discussion
Our results can be explained by voters rallying behind the government after fires. We say that an
event generates a rally if it increases voters’ preferences to support the government, regardless of
which party is in office and of the response of the government. Traditionally, rallies were associated
to international crises, such as wars. More recently, however, Chowanietz (2011) has shown that
there have also been rallies after “domestic” terrorist attacks.15 For example, it is well known
that George W. Bush’s approval rating increased dramatically after September 11. Our evidence
suggests that natural disasters can generate similar effects. This is, to some extent, unsurprising,
given that they share many of the key characteristics of international crises and terrorist attacks that
15Montalvo (2011), by contrast, finds that the Madrid attacks in 2004 reduced the incumbent’s vote share. Note,
however, that it is a study about one specific event, and hence a bad response of the government can drive the
results. In Chowanietz (2011) or in the present paper, we study many events and hence good and bad responses
should average out.
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facilitate the existence of rallies. In particular, they are dramatic, specific, and sudden (Mueller
(1973)). The latter point is crucial—Mueller claims that only sudden events can trigger rallies,
whereas the impact of gradual changes on public attitudes is likely to be diffused. Large wildfires
clearly share all these characteristics.
The main theory about rallies argues that they are a psychological phenomenon—they arise as
a consequence of a patriotic reflex to support the government of the affected area.16 In traditional
rallies due to international events or terrorism, it is the whole nation that it is in crisis, and therefore
citizens rally behind the national government or president—hence the expression “rally round the
flag”. In the case of fires, they affect one municipality in particular, and therefore it makes sense
that the rally is behind the leader of that municipality—its mayor or local government. The mayor
is the visible head of the municipality and acts as its symbolic leader after a fire. Spared from the
responsibility of putting off the fire, she is the visible representative of the town in order to demand
an adequate response from the regional and national governments.17
According to previous work, a rally translates into an increase in popularity or approval rate of
the government. However, the literature does not explicitly discuss how it affects the behavior of
voters when they face an election: voters would like to support the government that comes out of
the polls, but cannot know ex ante which party is going to form the government. Hence, we model
a rally in elections as an increase in the utility that voters derive from voting for the expected
winner—or, in other words, for the party that they believe will form the government. That voters
have a preference to vote for the winner has been found in some cases in the literature. Voters whose
original favorite candidate is not the leading candidate may switch their votes when they know the
identity of the leading candidate, because those voters may perceive less benefit from voting for the
candidate whom they feel is going to lose, thus creating “bandwagons” (Zech (1975)). We follow
this literature and model rallies as an increase in the utility that voters derive from voting for the
winner.
There are two plausible alternative ways to model rallies in elections. One is to assume that
voters will derive more utility from voting for the current, as opposed to the expected, government
after a shock. In this case, it is obvious that a shock will increase the expected incumbent’s vote
share. However, this model could not explain why stronger incumbents gain more from a fire. If
voters simply rally behind the incumbent, independently of whether they think the incumbent is
going to win or not, then all incumbents will equally benefit from a fire, independently of their
previous vote share. The other alternative is to assume that voters will derive more utility from
having a stronger government after a shock. In other words, they want to empower the government.
16Another reason argues that the key driving factor is that, during crises, the opposition subdues criticism of the
government (Brody (1991)). Of course, the question is then why the opposition does so. One possible answer is that
it is for patriotism, in which case this theory is very similar to the “patriotic reflex”. Another answer is that it is a
consequence of the opposition being “out of the loop”, that is, it lacks information to criticize the government.
17The mayor acts as the leader of the municipality during and after a large fire: she lobbies for resources to
be deployed and for an emergency declaration, coordinates the request for aid, and talks to the press—see, for
example, these newsreports (in Spanish): https://goo.gl/BXWNYR; https://goo.gl/nttgU5; https://goo.gl/jMHxYn;
https://goo.gl/dCHDJ7; https://goo.gl/H7LRsh; https://goo.gl/Bt2YP3; and https://goo.gl/eFF7U4.
A model with this feature is essentially equivalent to the one we outline, so this is a plausible
alternative interpretation of the rally in elections.
To formalize our mechanism, we develop a simple extension of the canonical model of proba-
bilistic voting. The goal of the model is not to explain why rallies happen, that is, why voters derive
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more utility from supporting the expected government in a crisis. Rather, the model takes this as
given and shows that, under mild conditions, a rally increases the vote share for the incumbent
party.
In the model, there are two parties, A and B. Suppose that party A is stronger, meaning that
more voters ideologically prefer party A to party B, and that voters know this (in Appendix B we
provide an alternative model in which voters are uncertain about the strength of parties and update
their priors based on the previous election’s vote shares). Voting is probabilistic—hence, in some
cases, the weaker party will win the election. If there is no fire, voters vote for their ideologically
preferred party. If there is a fire, voters derive some utility from voting for the expected winner,
as in Callander (2007). Hence, in case of a fire, bandwagon behavior arises, as voters rally behind
the expected government. In the example, some voters (those which are sufficiently close to the
indifference in ideology) will vote for party A even if they ideologically prefer party B, because
they believe that party A will win the election. The model yields two main predictions. First,
a fire increases the vote share of the incumbent. The intuition is simple—given that party A is
the stronger party in the municipality, the incumbent is more likely to be of party A. That is, the
incumbent is more likely to win the next election than the challenger, and hence a rally behind the
expected winner benefits the incumbent, on average. And second, the model yields an additional
testable prediction: that the effect of a fire on the incumbent’s vote share is increasing in the
incumbent’s vote share in the previous election. In other words, more voted incumbents (those
that won, for example, by 70-30) should benefit more from a fire than less voted incumbents (e.g
those that won by 52-48). The intuition is that the share of party A incumbents is increasing in
the incumbent’s vote share in the previous election. That is, among weak incumbents, there are
many cases in which the incumbent is of party B and, therefore, not very likely to win the next
election. In those cases, the rally will not favor the incumbent and, on average, the effect on the
incumbent’s vote share will be small. Strong incumbents are, however, overwhelmingly of party A
and therefore most of them will benefit from the rally, hence creating a large effect of a fire. We
find strong evidence for this additional prediction.
We believe that this mechanism is the most consistent with the available evidence. First, it
can naturally explain why the effect of a fire on the incumbent’s vote share is positive. Second,
this mechanism explains why the effect is larger when the incumbent is stronger, while alternative
mechanisms cannot easily account for this. Third, this mechanism provides a compelling argument
for why only fires close to the election affect the results. The reason is that rallies are temporary—
they only last while the triggering event remains a salient issue. For example, as mentioned in the
introduction, the duration of three rallies examined by Hetherington and Nelson (2003) was 8, 10,
and 14 months. A rally mechanism can therefore explain why only fires up to 9 months before the
election increase the incumbent’s vote share. Fourth, it can explain why fires increase the votes for
the party of the local government but not for those at the regional or national governments. Even
though most of the competences are at the regional and national levels, it is the local government
who specifically represents the affected municipality, and mayors are its symbolic leaders. While
international crises affect the whole country, that is not the case for wildfires, which affect very
specific locations.
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5.1.2 Model: Setup
There are two parties, A and B, and a continuum of voters, with utility function:
ui(A) = λi + γP (Awins) +  (6)
ui(B) = γP (Bwins) (7)
where ui(j) denotes the utility that voter i derives from voting for party j, j ∈ {A,B}. The
utility depends on two components: an ideological component and a bandwagon component. In
particular, λi is voter’s i ideological preference for party A relative to party B, P (Awins) denotes
the probability that party j wins the election, as estimated by the voter, and γ captures the relative
importance of the ideological and bandwagon components. Voters are distributed according to their
ideological preference for party A as follows: λi ∼ U(−1/2, 1/2).18 Finally,  is a popularity shock,
 ∼ N(−1/2 + nA, σ2).19 Hence, nA captures the relative strength of party A. If nA = 1/2, then
both parties have equal strength. If nA > 1/2 (nA < 1/2), then party A is stronger (weaker) than
B. Voters know nA and σ
2—in the Appendix model, we consider an alternative model in which
they do not know nA: rather, they have a prior and use the vote shares of the previous election to
update their beliefs. This alternative model yields similar predictions.
As argued above, we claim that a fire will generate a rally, increasing the utility that voters
derive from voting for the winner. Without loss of generality, we assume that γ = 0 if there was no
fire, and γ > 0 if there was a fire during the term. Suppose that there are two periods, t ∈ {1, 2}. In
each period there is an independent realization of the shock 1, 2. In period 1, there is no fire, and
in period 2 there is a fire before the election with some probability p > 0, and this is independent
of all other variables. Hence, the timing is as follows:
1. Nature draws 1.
2. Voters vote (t = 1 election).
3. The party that wins the election (that is, obtains more than 1/2 vote share) forms government
and becomes the incumbent.
18In the original probabilistic voting there is an additional parameter to capture the dispersion of the uniform
distribution. This only matters, however, if there are several groups of voters. In the model in this paper, therefore,
introducing such a parameter would not affect any result.
19While we assume normality for clarity, the results go through other distributions—in particular, all beta distri-
butions. In the remaining of the model, we assume that the probability that the variance of the shock is sufficiently
low so that the probabilities that vote shares are outside the (0,1) interval are negligible.
4. Nature draws fire and 2.
5. Voters vote (t = 2 election).
There are two main differences between this model and the standard probabilistic voting
model (Persson and Tabellini (2002), chapter 3.4). First, we include a term to capture the rally,
γE(Awins). Second, in our model, parties are not players of the game. In the original model, par-
ties fix their platforms to maximize their probability of election. Here, policy platforms are fixed.
This is a reasonable assumption for Spanish local elections, especially in small or medium-sized
municipalities: given that parties are national, their local branches are associated with the position
of the party at the national level and do not have much flexibility to adjust their platforms. Indeed,
there are many municipalities in which one party systematically beats the other at the polls in local
elections, which is not consistent with parties adjusting their platforms locally.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 21 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1810
5.1.3 Model: Solution
The model’s main prediction is given by the following proposition.
Proposition 1. There exists an equilibrium in which a fire increases the expected incumbent’s vote
share at t = 2. If voters do not anticipate the rally, this equilibrium is unique.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The model yields an additional prediction, which we test in the data in the next subsection.
Proposition 2. The expected effect of a fire on the incumbent’s vote share at t = 2 is increasing
in the incumbent’s vote share at t = 1.
This proposition says that incumbents that were more voted in the previous election gain more
from a fire than less voted incumbents.
Proof. See Appendix A.
5.1.4 Testable implication
The model predicts that the effect of a fire on the incumbent’s vote share should be increasing in
the incumbent’s vote share in the previous election (see Proposition 2).
Here we test this prediction, by estimating the following equation:
ΔIncV oteShareit = αSM,pt + βb,SMFireSM,it + βs,SMStrongz,it
+βa,SMFireSM,it ∗ Strongz,it + SM,it. (8)
where Strongz,it is a dummy that indicates whether the incumbent was above the z percentile
in the vote share of incumbents in the previous election (at t − 4). For example, if z = 50, this
considers the median, which amounts to a vote share of 56.25%. Hence, Strong50,it = 1 if the
incumbent obtained more than 56.25% of the vote in the previous election, and Strong50,it = 0
otherwise. We are interested in the coefficients βb,SM and βa,SM , which capture the effect of a fire
on “weak” incumbents, and the differential effect of a fire on “strong” incumbents (relative to weak
incumbents). We expect βa,SM > 0.
The results of this test are displayed in Table 8. We consider three values of z: z = 25, z = 50,
and z = 75. Column 1 shows the results for z = 50 and S = 1%. While fires do not help weak
incumbents much (the point estimate is 1.4, and it is not significant), strong incumbents obtain
6.4 p.p. more votes after a fire relative to weak incumbents, so the total increase in vote share for
strong incumbents is 7.8 p.p. The remaining columns consider other values of z and S. In all the
specifications but one the effects are statistically significant, and are always large in magnitude.
The results are therefore consistent with the model: the stronger the incumbent party is, the more
it benefits electorally from a fire in the last months before an election.
A caveat in interpreting these results is that there is no exogenous variation in the incumbent’s
vote share. Hence, it might be the case that the heterogeneity is driven by some omitted variable
and not by the incumbent’s vote share per se. In particular, we do find that municipalities with a
strong incumbent (above the median) are smaller than those with a weak incumbent (average of
1,053 inhabitants versus 7,602). To assess whether this difference is driving the heterogeneity by
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the strength of the incumbent, we add population size as a control to the regressions—that is, we
compare how strong and weak incumbents do after a fire, in municipalities of the same size. The
results, displayed in Appendix Table A1, show that the heterogeneity by the incumbent’s strength
decreases slightly but remains large and significant.
5.2 Blind retrospection
This theory was proposed by Achen and Bartels (2004) and is extensively discussed in the recent
book Achen and Bartels (2016). According to this theory, voters compare their well-being at the
beginning and at the end of the term. If their well-being increased (decreased), they reward (punish)
the incumbent. Voters are irrational and behave this way even if the change in their well-being was
due to events that are outside the control of the incumbent.
We claim that it is hard to believe that such behavior can explain our findings. Given that fires
are a negative or at least not-positive shocks, they should reduce the votes for the incumbent, and
the estimated effect would accordingly be negative.
Might fires be a positive shock? For this theory to explain the effect that we find, fires
would have to be a positive shock, that is, they would increase the well-being of voters. We can
think of two main reasons why this could happen. One is that the affected municipality receives
aid after the fire, and that this aid offsets the possible negative effects of the fire. Indeed, in the few
papers that have found a positive effect of a natural disasters on the incumbent’s vote share, aid
has always been the channel (Bechtel and Hainmueller (2011), Chen (2013), Healy and Malhotra
(2009)). Another possible reason is that the local government uses the fire to rezone the burnt land
to urban land and that this generates a wealth effect through the increase in the value of the land.
We now explore these two possibilities in turn.
The effect of aid. There are several reasons why aid is unlikely to explain our findings. First
of all, aid in Spain is given out by the regional and national governments. Hence, if voters reward
the incumbent for aid, it would be more natural to expect that voters reward regional and national
governments after a fire, and not local governments, while we find that the opposite is true. To
further explore the aid channel, we exploit micro data on aid approved by the national government
after natural disasters.20 We find three additional reasons why aid is not a plausible explanation for
our results. First, aid is not very common: only 7.5% of municipalities that suffered an accidental
wildfire received national aid. Second, aid takes time to arrive: on average, it is approved 200
days after a fire. This implies that many of the fires that are close to the election and benefit the
incumbent have not had any aid approved by the election day. Third, this theory cannot explain
the differential effect by time to election. In Appendix Table A2 we test whether municipalities
that have a fire in the last year of the term receive more aid than those having a fire earlier in the
term. The results show that, if anything, municipalities with a fire at the end of the term receive
less aid. Therefore, aid cannot explain by itself why voters vote more for the incumbent when there
is a fire towards the end of the term than when the fire is earlier.
Rezoning actions after a fire. Another way in which one might think that fires could be
a positive shock is through land rezoning. In Spain, land is divided by the government into three
20The data come from Proteccio´n Civil, an institution within the Ministry of Domestic Affairs. It covers subsidies
granted to municipalities in the wake of natural disasters, including wildfires, in the period 2006-2012. Unfortunately,
there are no available data for regional aid.
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categories: urban, developable, and rural. Building in rural land is in general prohibited. Hence, if
local governments rezone rural land as developable after a fire, then this could increase the value
of the land and generate a positive wealth effect.21
We can directly test this hypothesis in the data. To do so, we have downloaded data on the
zoning of land (rural, developable, or urban) by year. The data come from the Spanish Land
Registry Agency for the period 1994-2016. We consider the following regressions:
UrbanSurfaceit+j − UrbanSurfaceit = αSM,pt + ζSMFireSM,it + θSM,it, (9)
for different values of j (j ∈ 1, 2, 5), where the variable UrbanSurface is defined as the log of the
surface area of the municipality that is developable or urban. That is, we estimate if (the log of)
the urban or developable surface area in the municipality increases 1, 2, or 5 years after a fire.22
The results from this test are shown in Appendix Table A3. All the coefficients are close to zero and
statistically insignificant, which provides evidence against the hypothesis that local governments
systematically rezone the land status after accidental fires.23
The economic effect of fires. As a final test to assess the possibility that a fire is a positive
g
21The soil can also be devoted to common areas (e.g. roads) or be protected (e.g. natural parks). Our regression
below can account also for rezoning of these areas, e.g. from protected to urban.
22The results are very similar if we use the log of the share of the municipality’s surface area that is urban.
23In fact, this is not a surprising finding. Since 2006, it is prohibited by national law to rezone land during 30 years
after a fire. Before 2006, regulation was at the regional level, and most of it prohibited it as well.
shock, we estimate the effect on the economy of the affected municipality. We estimate:
UnemRateit+j − UnemRateit = αSM,pt + ζSMFireSM,it + θSM,it, (10)
for different values of j (j ∈ 1, 2, 5). We also consider population size, instead of the unemployment
rate, as the dependent variable. If fires are a positive shock for the affected municipality, then we
expect a fire to reduce the unemployment rate and increase the population size. The results of
these tests are shown in Appendix Table A4. Panel A (B) shows the results for unemployment rate
(population size), for 1 year (columns 1 and 4), 2 years (columns 2 and 5) and 5 years (columns 3 and
6) after the fire. The results are close to zero and insignificant for all unemployment specifications,
against the hypothesis that the economy benefits from a fire. For population size, most coefficients
are also insignificant. The exception is the effect of fires burning at least 2% of the surface area
of the municipality in the last six months before an election, which decreases population size by
4%. Although it is hard to conclude from this that fires are economically bad for the affected
municipalities, the results do seem to rule out the possibility that suffering from a wildfire could
turn out to be positive for the local economy.
5.3 “Rational updating”
In a recent paper, Ashworth, De Mesquita, and Friedenberg (2017) show that it may be rational for
voters to change their voting behavior after a shock, even if the shock was outside of the incumbent’s
control. The intuition is that the shock can reveal the quality of the incumbent, either through the
response given to the shock or through the shock revealing the quality of the prevention measures.
Consider the following example. There are two types of politicians, high quality and low quality.
In any given municipality, a representative voter has to vote for either the incumbent or a challenger,
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and the voter is uncertain about their quality. Suppose that 60% of incumbents are high quality,
while only 30% of challengers are high quality (and these are the priors). Suppose that, if there is no
fire during the term, then the voter does not learn anything about the quality of the incumbent (or
the challenger). If there is a fire, then the voter will learn the true quality of the incumbent (and
will learn nothing about the challenger). Then, in almost all municipalities with no fire, voters
will follow their priors and think that the incumbent is more likely to be high quality than the
challenger. Hence, almost all of the incumbents will be reelected. By contrast, in municipalities
with a fire, voters learn the true quality of the incumbent—60% of the times will be high quality,
and 40% will be low quality. Hence, only 60% of incumbents will be reelected. In this example, by
revealing the true quality of incumbents, fires reduce the incumbents’ vote shares.
This theory is therefore a clean way to rationalize some of the findings that previous work had
attributed to voter irrationality. There are four reasons, however, why we argue that it cannot
explain the entirety of our evidence.
First, we believe that the more reasonable assumptions of the Ashworth, De Mesquita, and
Friedenberg (2017) model would lead to a negative effect of a fire on the incumbent’s vote share.
In their model, the direction of the effect depends on two key assumptions: whether the shock
“reveals” or “mutes” the quality of the incumbent, and whether the incumbent is ahead or below
the challenger. The shock reveals (mutes) the quality of the incumbent if the difference in the
welfare of voters between being governed by a high- and a low-quality incumbent is higher (lower)
with a shock than without a shock—that is, if the welfare of voters is more sensitive to the quality
of the government when there is a shock. The incumbent is ahead (behind) the challenger if the
probability that the politician is high quality is larger for the incumbent (challenger). In the
example that we discussed above, we assumed that the shock (completely) revealed the quality of
the incumbent, and that the incumbent was ahead of the challenger. Under these assumptions, the
shock decreases the incumbent’s vote share, as we saw. If either of the two assumptions is reversed,
however, then the model will indeed predict that the shock increases the incumbent’s vote share, as
we find in our results. It is possible to come up with some stories in which that happens.24 They
are not, however, the most likely—it is more natural to think that politicians make more difference
to the welfare of voters in times of crisis, and that incumbents are, on average, ahead of challengers,
as they have already been elected for office, at least once.
Second, this mechanism cannot explain why only fires close to the election matter—the quality
of the incumbent should be revealed (or muted) no matter when the fire happens. While adding
myopia or forgetfulness to the model could explain why only fires close to the election matter,
that extension would be unappealing, given that the point of the Ashworth, De Mesquita, and
Friedenberg (2017)’s model is to rationalize the response of voters.
Third, as discussed in Section 2, most of the competences on prevention and extinction are
at the regional and national levels. Although mayors also have some role in the management of
the crises, especially as representative leaders of the municipality, there is no reason to think that
the quality of regional or national governments should be revealed (or muted) less than that of
local governments—if anything, the opposite should be true. Hence, if the effect is driven by a
24Ashworth, De Mesquita, and Friedenberg (2017) give the following case an example in which the shock mutes
the true quality of the incumbent: “Suppose that good types are better at attracting investment. In normal times,
good types will oversee better economic performance. But a natural disaster might stop investment, irrespective of
the type of the incumbent. In this case, disasters mute the effect of type.”
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“revealing-the-quality” argument, it is not obvious why there is an effect on local elections but not
on regional or national elections.
Fourth, for this model to explain why the effect is larger when the incumbent is stronger, we
would need that, either a) if the positive effect is caused by the fire obscuring the quality of the
incumbent, then the quality is more muted when the incumbent is stronger, or b) if the positive
effect is caused by the challenger being ahead of the challenger, then the challenger is more ahead
of the incumbent when the incumbent is stronger. It is not obvious why either of these two
assumptions should hold.
5.4 Alternative mechanisms
Preferences over parties. One possibility is that fires temporarily change the partisan prefer-
ences of voters. For example, suppose that a fire makes voters more concerned about the environ-
ment. Then, left-wing parties might benefit in the next election. If most of the incumbents are left
wing, then this can explain why incumbents win votes, on average.
To study this possible mechanism, we perform two tests. First, we analyze how the main parties
fare after a fire, independently of whether they are the incumbent or not. Given that, during the
sample period, Spain was an (imperfect) bipartisan system, we focus on the two main parties in
Spain, the right-wing Partido Popular (PP) and the left-wing Partido Socialista Obrero Espan˜ol
(PSOE).25. To study this question, we run Equation (1), letting the outcome variable be the change
in votes for the PP or the PSOE, instead of the change in votes for the incumbent. The results are
shown in Panel A of Appendix Table A5. The first and fourth columns show the baseline results
with the whole sample, for M=6 months and S=1% and S=2%, respectively. The second and fifth
(third and sixth) columns show the effect of a fire on the vote shares for the PP (PSOE). No
coefficient is statistically different from zero, even at the 10% level, indicating that neither party
gains or loses votes, on average, after a fire.
Second, we test whether the effect of a fire on the incumbent’s vote share differs by party.
The results of this test are shown in Panel B of Appendix Table A5. As before, the first and
fourth columns show the baseline results of the effect of a fire on the incumbent’s vote share, for
M=6 months and S=1% and S=2%, respectively. The second and fifth columns show the results
when we restrict the sample to PP incumbents, and the third and sixth when we do so for PSOE
incumbents.26 The estimates are very similar and significant in all cases, indicating that both PP
and PSOE incumbents gain votes after a fire.
Preferences over alignment. It could be argued that, after a fire, voters have stronger
preferences for their local government to be aligned with the regional (or national) government.
If most of the incumbents are aligned, then that could explain why they gain votes in the next
election after a fire. To assess this possibility, we perform two tests that are parallel to the ones we
carried out for the partisan preferences.
First, we estimate whether the party that is aligned with the regional (or national) government
gains votes in the next election after the fire. The results of this test are shown in Appendix Table
A6. The first and fourth columns show the baseline results of the effect of a fire on the incumbent’s
25The PP obtained an average vote share of 40.4% in the municipalities with a 1% fire in the last 6 months before
an election, and the PSOE, an average of 41.6%
26The PP was the incumbent in 17,259 out of the 46,877 observations in our dataset, while the PSOE was the
incumbent in 15,903. In most of the remaining cases, the incumbent was some regional, local, or independent party.
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vote share, for M=6 months and S=1 and S=2%, respectively. In the second and fifth (third and
sixth) columns, we show the effect of a fire on the change in votes for the party that is aligned with
the regional (national) government. The results show that regional and national incumbents do
not systematically gain (or lose) votes after a fire, against the hypothesis that the effect is driven
by the preferences of voters to align their local governments with other layers of governments.
Second, we test whether the effect of a fire on the incumbent’s vote share differs for aligned and
non-aligned parties. The results of this test are shown in Panel B of Appendix Table A6. When
we restrict the sample to incumbents that are aligned with the regional party (columns (2) and
(5)), the effect remains similar in magnitude to the baseline specification (columns (1) and (4)),
which studies the effect on all incumbents. The same is true for incumbents that are aligned with
the national government (columns (3) and (6)), although the point estimate loses significance for
1% fires. These results therefore indicate that the alignment status does not affect the reaction of
voters to fires, as both aligned and non-aligned incumbents increase their vote share similarly after
a fire.
6 Conclusion
We have shown that a large accidental fire in the last 9 months before a local election in Spain
increases the incumbent’s vote share by up to 8 p.p. Fires earlier in the term (farther from the
next election) do not have an effect. We have also shown that fires before a regional or national
election do not produce similar effects, and that stronger incumbents benefit more from a fire than
weaker incumbents. We have argued that these effects are most consistent with a rally effect and
formalized the mechanism in a simple model.
We conclude with a brief discussion and suggesting some avenues for future research. Our finding
that a natural disaster increases the incumbent’s vote share goes against most previous literature,
which had found that these shocks usually generate negative effects. One possible reason for this
divergence is that, unlike most previous research, not only do we study national elections but also
local and regional ones. If our suggested mechanism is correct, a natural disaster makes voters
willing to rally behind the leader of the affected area—the local government in our case. Hence,
the findings of this paper imply that it is important that future research studies the electoral
consequences of natural disasters on elections for different layers of government, who are likely to
play different roles during the crisis. Similarly, given that our results cannot be fully explained by
previous theories, we believe that it is also important that future research integrates behavioral
responses (e.g., myopia or rally effects) into formal models of voter behavior.
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Figures
Figure 1: Effect of a Fire on the Incumbent’s Vote Share, by Time to Election, Fires of Size S=1%
The figure shows the effect of a fire burning (at least) 1% of the municipality surface area, by
time to a local election. The y-axis shows the point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for
β1M , obtained from ΔIncV oteShareit = α1M,pt + β1MFire1M,it + 1M,it, for different values of M
(x-axis). The coefficients to the right of the vertical line are placebo tests that show the “effect”
of fires that happen after the election. The standard errors are clustered by municipality.
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Figure 2: Effect of a Fire on the Incumbent’s Vote Share, by Size of the Fire
The figure shows the effect of a fire in the 6 months before a local election, by size of the
fire. The y-axis shows the point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for βS6, obtained from
ΔIncV oteShareit = αS6,pt + βFireS6,it + S6,it, for different values of S (x-axis). The standard
errors are clustered by municipality.
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Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Panel A: Summary Statistics
Variable/Sample All 1% Fire 1% Fire 6 m
at any time before local election
Population (inhab.) 5175 5945 5149
(44993) (76660) (20391)
[8,065] [1,756] [55]
Surface (ha.) 6244 6346 5999
(9264) (9157) (6499)
[8,065] [1,756] [55]
Votes Incumbent (%) 58.1 58.3 57.9
(12.3) (11.7) (11.7)
[8,065] [1,756] [55]
Unemployment (%) 4.1 4.2 4.2
(2.1) (2.0) (1.4)
[8,062] [1,755] [55]
Votes PP (%) 39.5 39.5 38.7
(20.3) (20.3) (18.5)
[7,651] [1,691] [54]
Votes PSOE (%) 36.9 37.9 39.6
(16.4) (15.9) (16.6)
[7,726] [1,714] [55]
The table shows the mean, the standard deviation (in parentheses), and the num-
ber of observations (in square brackets) of the indicated variables. The unit of
observation is a municipality: for each municipality, we have first averaged the
values of the variables across all the years in the sample.
Panel B: Number of Observations with FireSM,it = 1
Size/Months to Election 0-12 0-9 0-6 0-3 0-6 12-18 24-30 36-42
1% 665 153 58 41 58 87 96 69
2% 449 86 29 20 29 42 52 30
3% 354 63 23 15 23 31 17 17
The table shows the number of observations with a fire burning at least S% of the surface
area of the municipality the last M months before an election. The unit of observation is a
municipality-year.
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Table 2: Effect of a Fire on the Incumbent’s Vote Share (Local Elections)
Panel A: Effect by Time to Election
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fire1,M -0.0461 -0.0784 0.0638 2.189* 4.230*** 3.210**
(0.584) (0.592) (0.626) (1.234) (1.449) (1.447)
Months to election 18 15 12 9 6 3
αpt YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 46877 46877 46877 46877 46877 46877
Panel B: Effect by Size of the Fire
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FireS,6 1.539 4.230*** 7.069*** 7.361*** 7.577** 7.901*
(1.155) (1.449) (2.140) (2.516) (3.061) (4.150)
Size of the fire .5% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5%
αpt YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 46877 46877 46877 46877 46877 46877
Panel A shows the effect of an accidental fire burning (at least) 1% of the municipality surface
area on the incumbent’s vote share, by time to election. Each column is obtained from a
separate regression, ΔIncV oteShareit = α1M,pt + β1MFire1M,it + 1M,it, for different values
of M . Standard errors, clustered by municipality, are in parentheses. Panel B shows the effect
of a fire in the last 6 months before the election, by size of the fire. Each column is obtained
from a separate regression, ΔIncV oteShareit = αS6,pt + βS6FireS6,it + S6,it, for different
values of S. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
Table 3: Effects on Regional and National Elections
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ΔV Inc ΔV Inc ΔV Inc ΔV Inc ΔV Inc ΔV Inc
F ire1,6 4.230*** 0.737 0.261
(1.449) (0.646) (0.639)
Fire2,6 7.069*** 0.471 1.163
(2.140) (0.728) (1.102)
Elections Local Regional National Local Regional National
αpt YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 46877 44364 56195 46877 44364 56195
The table shows the effect of an accidental fire burning (at least) 1% of the municipality
surface area in the last 6 months before an election on the incumbent’s vote share, by the type
of election (local, regional, or national). Each column is obtained from a separate regression,
ΔIncV oteShareit = αS6,pt + βS6FireS6,it + S6,it, for S = 1% or S = 2%. Standard errors,
clustered by municipality, are in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Table 4: Robustness: Effect of a 1% Fire, 6 Months to Election
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ΔV Inc ΔV Inc ΔV Inc ΔV Inc ΔV Inc ΔV Inc
F ire1,6 4.230*** 3.888** 4.311*** 4.636*** 4.736*** 4.087***
(1.449) (1.545) (1.454) (1.708) (1.727) (1.479)






N 46877 34463 46877 46877 46877 37459
The table shows the effect of an accidental fire burning (at least) 1% of the
municipality surface area in the last 6 months before a local election on the
incumbent’s vote share. Each column is obtained from a separate regression,
ΔIncV oteShareit = α1,6,pt + β1,6Fire1,6,it + 1,6,it, for different combinations of
fixed effects and controls (population size and unemployment rate). Standard
errors, clustered by municipality, are in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05,
*p < 0.1.
Table 5: Placebo Tests: “Effect” of a Fire on the Lagged Incumbent’s Vote Share
Panel A: Effect by Time to Election
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fire1,M 0.0507 -0.0194 0.113 -0.871 -0.801 0.0454
(0.690) (0.703) (0.736) (1.498) (2.637) (2.797)
Months to election 18 15 12 9 6 3
αpt YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 33736 33736 33736 33736 33736 33736
Panel B: Effect by Size of the Fire
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FireS,6 -1.180 -0.801 -3.283 -3.290 -3.498 -1.538
(1.613) (2.637) (3.393) (4.270) (5.759) (8.245)
Size of the fire .5% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5%
αpt YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 33736 33736 33736 33736 33736 33736
Panel A shows the “effect” of an accidental fire burning (at least) 1% of the municipal-
ity surface area, by time to election, on the on the incumbent’s vote share in the previ-
ous election. Each column is obtained from a separate regression, ΔIncV oteShareit−4 =
α1M,pt + β1MFire1M,it + 1M,it−4, for different values of M . Standard errors, clustered by
municipality, are in parentheses. Panel B shows the effect of a fire in the last 6 months be-
fore the election, by size of the fire. Each column is obtained from a separate regression,
ΔIncV oteShareit−4 = αS6,pt + βS6FireS6,it + S6,it−4, for different values of S. ***p < 0.01,
**p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Table 6: Placebo Tests b: “Effect” of a Fire on Lagged Unemployment and Population Size
Panel A: Unemployment Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fire1,6 -0.0964 0.180 -0.265
(0.0999) (0.147) (0.200)
Fire2,6 -0.0946 0.231 -0.228
(0.149) (0.192) (0.271)
Years before the election 1 2 5 1 2 5
αpt YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 40287 32258 32210 40287 32258 32210
Panel B: Population Size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fire1,6 0.00601 0.0119 -0.0119
(0.00572) (0.00920) (0.0163)
Fire2,6 0.0144 0.0146 -0.00815
(0.00953) (0.0151) (0.0283)
Years before the election 1 2 5 1 2 5
αpt YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 56397 40315 48288 56397 40315 48288
Panel A shows the “effect” of an accidental fire burning (at least) 1% (or 2%, in the second row) of the municipality
surface area, in the last 6 months before a local election, on the change in unemployment rate between the years
indicated in the “years before the election” row and the election year. Each column is obtained from a separate
regression, UnemRateit − UnemRatei,t−j = αS6,pt + ζS6FireS6,it + θSM,it, for S = 1% or S = 2%, and for j = 1,
j = 2, or j = 5, as indicated in the “Years before the election” row. Standard errors, clustered by municipality, are
in parentheses. Panel B is analogous, for population size instead of unemployment rate. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05,
*p < 0.1.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 35 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1810
Table 7: Alternative Specification: Differential Effect by Time to Election
Panel A: Effect by Time to Election
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fire1,M 0.362 0.310 0.496 2.658** 4.637*** 3.564**
(0.728) (0.731) (0.750) (1.285) (1.482) (1.478)
Fire1,48 -0.427 -0.407 -0.455 -0.495 -0.431 -0.374
(0.444) (0.441) (0.428) (0.372) (0.363) (0.362)
Months to election 18 15 12 9 6 3
αpt YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 46877 46877 46877 46877 46877 46877
Panel B: Effect by Size of the Fire
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FireS,6 1.663 4.637*** 7.371*** 8.226*** 8.546*** 8.745**
(1.186) (1.482) (2.190) (2.570) (3.111) (4.197)
FireS,48 -0.136 -0.431 -0.310 -0.881* -0.983* -0.852
(0.297) (0.363) (0.459) (0.512) (0.582) (0.637)
Size of the fire .5% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5%
αpt YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 46877 46877 46877 46877 46877 46877
Panel A shows the effect of an accidental fire burning (at least) 1% of the municipality surface
area on the incumbent’s vote share, by time to election. Each column is obtained from a
separate regression, ΔIncV oteShareit = α1M,pt+β1,1MFire1M,it+β2,1MFire1,48,it+ψ1M,it,
for different values of M . Standard errors, clustered by municipality, are in parentheses. Panel
B shows the effect of a fire in the last 6 months before the election, by size of the fire. Each
column is obtained from a separate regression, ΔIncV oteShareit = αS6,pt + β1,S6FireS6,it +
β2,S6FireS48,it + ψS6,it, for different values of S.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
Table 8: Effects by Strength of the Incumbent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ΔV Inc ΔV Inc ΔV Inc ΔV Inc ΔV Inc ΔV Inc
F ireS,6 1.376 4.916 1.723 4.808** -0.539 0.144
(2.132) (3.024) (1.619) (2.420) (2.657) (4.422)
FireS,6*Strongz 6.447** 4.412 11.75*** 9.972** 6.640** 9.366*
(2.751) (3.854) (3.060) (3.121) (4.984) (4.984)
Size of fire (S) 1% 2% 1% 2% 1% 2%
Strong (z) > 50 > 50 > 75 > 75 > 25 > 25
αpt YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 46877 46877 46877 46877 46877 46877
The table shows the effect of an accidental fire burning (at least) 1% (or 2%) of the mu-
nicipality surface area in the last six months before a local election on the incumbent’s vote
share, by the strength of the incumbent. Each column is obtained from a separate regression,
ΔIncV oteShareit = αS6,pt+βS6FireS6,it+βS6Strongit+βS6FireS6,it∗Strongz,it+S6,it, for
S = 1% or S = 2%, as indicated in the “Size of fire” row, and for z = 50, z = 75, or z = 25,
as indicated in the “Strong” row, where z indicates the percentile of the incumbent’s vote
share in the previous election. Standard errors, clustered by municipality, are in parentheses.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Online Appendices
Appendix A: Model Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1.
Proof. We start by deriving an expression for the effect of a fire on a given party’s vote share. Then
we will study the effect of a fire on the incumbent’s vote share. In period 1, there is no fire, so
γ = 0. There is an indifferent voter λ˜ = − such that all voters with λi < λ˜ vote for party B and
all voters with λi > λ˜ vote for party A. Hence, the vote share for party A at t = 1 is given by:
VA1 = 1/2 + 1,
and the probability that party A wins the election and becomes the incumbent is
P (VA1 > 1/2) = P ( > 0) = 1− P (Z < 1/2− nA
σ
),
where a Z is a standard normal random variable.
Now consider period 2, and let us focus first on the case in which there is no fire (fire = 0).
Given that, in this case, voters do not care about voting for the winner (γ = 0), everything is like
in the first period. Hence, the vote share for party A at t = 2 when there is no fire is given by:
VA2|fire=0 = 1/2 + 2, (11)
and the probability that party A is the winner is
P (VA2 > 1/2|fire = 0) = P ( > 0|fire = 0) = P ( > 0) = 1− P (Z < 1/2− nA
σ
), (12)
Now consider t = 2 when there is a fire. Now the beliefs of voters on the strength of the parties
matter because they do care about voting for the winner. We consider two cases: that voters do
not anticipate the rally, and that they do.
Case 1. Voters do not anticipate the rally.
We study first the case in which voters do not anticipate the rally. That is, once a voter has
observed the fire, i.e. γ > 0 in her utility function, but behave as if the rest of the voters will act as
if γ = 0, not anticipating that other voters will also rally behind the winner. Hence, voters think,
naively, that the vote shares will be given by Equation 11, and the probabilities of winning, by
Equation 12.
For convenience, we define:
ρ ≡ P (VA2 < 1/2|fire = 1) = P (Z < 1/2− nA
σ
) (13)
That is, ρ is the probability that party B will be the most voted in the election at t = 2 in case
of fire, as estimated by the voters.
We now calculate the vote shares in case of fire. The indifferent voter will be given by the
following expression:
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λ˜ = −2 + γ(2ρ− 1).
Given that all voters with λi < λ˜ vote for B and all voters with λi > λ˜ vote for A, the vote
share for party is given by:
VA2|fire=1 = 1/2 + 2 − γ(2ρ− 1). (14)
We can now compare the vote shares in the second period when there is fire and when there
is no fire, given by Equations 14 and 11. The difference between the two equations is given by
−γ(2ρ− 1). If ρ > 1/2, then vA2|fire=1 < vA2|fire=0. That is, if voters believe that party B is more
likely to win the election than party A (ρ > 1/2), then the fire benefits party B.
So far we have studied how a fire affects the vote share of a given party. We study now how a
fire affects the vote share of the incumbent party.
If there is no fire, then the incumbent’s vote share in the second-period election is:
E(VI2|fire = 0) = P (VA1 > 1/2)E(VA2|fire = 0, VA1 > 1/2)
+P (VA1 < 1/2)(1− E(VA2|fire = 0, VA1 < 1/2)).
The first term considers the case in which party A is the incumbent. This happens with
probability P (VA1 > 1/2). Similarly, the second term considers the case in which party B is the
incumbent. Given that, when there is no fire, vote shares in the second period are independent of
those in the first period, we can rewrite the previous expression as:
E(VI2|fire = 0) = P (VA1 > 1/2)E(VA2|fire = 0) + P (VA1 < 1/2)(1− E(VA2|fire = 0)).
Using Equation 11,
E(VI2|fire = 0) = P (VA1 > 1/2)nA + P (VA1 < 1/2)(1− nA). (15)
If there is a fire, then
E(VI2|fire = 1) = P (VA1 > 1/2)E(VA2|fire = 1, VA1 > 1/2)
+P (VA1 < 1/2)(1− E(VA2|fire = 1, VA1 < 1/2)).
Using Equation 14,
E(VI2|fire = 1) = P (VA1 > 1/2)[nA − γ(2ρ− 1)] (16)
+P (VA1 < 1/2)[1− nA + γ(2ρ− 1).
The difference between the expressions 16 and 15 is the expected effect of a fire on the votes of
the incumbent:
E(δ) ≡ E(VI2|fire = 1)− E(VI2|fire = 0) = −γP (VA1 > 1/2)(2ρ− 1) + γP (VA1 < 1/2)(2ρ− 1)
= γ(2ρ− 1)(P (VA1 < 1/2)− P (VA1 > 1/2))
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But note that ρ = P (VA1 < 1/2)—that is, the probability that party B wins the second period
when there is fire, as estimated by voters, is the same as the probability that party B wins the first
period, because voters do not anticipate the rally. Hence,
E(δ) = γ(2ρ− 1)2 > 0,
that is, incumbents benefit, on average, from a fire.
Case 2. Voters do anticipate the rally.
Now voters are more sophisticated and predict that other voters may also rally after a fire.
Hence, the estimated distribution of the vote shares in the second period is now given by:
ˆ˜VA2 ∼ N(nA − γ(2ρ˜− 1), σ2)
where ρ˜ is the probability of party B winning, as estimated by voters, Hence,
ρ˜ = P (Z <
1/2− nA + γ(2ρ˜− 1)
σ
). (17)
Consider the case in which nA > 1/2. The case for nA < 1/2 is symmetric. The expected effect
of a fire is now given by:
E(δ˜) = γ(2ρ˜− 1)(P (VA1 < 1/2)− P (VA1 > 1/2)) (18)
The sign of E(δ˜) is given by the signs of the three terms of Equation 18. Obviously, γ > 0. With
respect to the second term, note that, if nA > 0, then ρ < 1/2. But then, there exists a solution to
equation 17 such that ρ˜ < ρ. (We cannot rule out that other solutions exist to this Equation—the
equilibrium may not be unique.) Hence, ρ˜ < 1/2, and the second term is in Equation 18 is negative.
Finally, the third term is also negative if nA > 0. Hence, E(δ˜) > 0.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Proof. We consider the case in which voters do not anticipate the rally (the case in which they do
is analogous). Consider the case in which nA > 1/2. The case for nA < 1/2 is symmetric.
We want to study how a fire increases the vote share of the incumbent party, for any given vI1.
This is given by this expression:
E(δ˜|VI1 = vI1) = −γ(2ρ˜− 1)fA(vI1)
fI(vI1)
+ γ(2ρ˜− 1)fA(1− vI1)
fI(vI1)
, (19)
for vI1 ≥ 1/2, where fA be the density function of VA1, and fI the density of VI1, −γ(2ρ− 1) is the
vote share gain of party A due to a fire, and γ(2ρ− 1) is the vote share gain of party B. These two
terms are weighted by the relative frequency of parties A and B being the incumbent conditional
on the incumbent having obtained vI1 vote share. Rearranging,
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Note that fI(vI1) = fA(vI1) + fA(1 − vI1)—there are two ways an incumbent obtains a share
vI1 of the votes: that party A obtains vI1, or that party B obtains vI1, which is the same as party
A obtaining 1− vI1. Hence,
E(δ|VI1 = vI1) = −γ(2ρ− 1)fA(vI1)− fA(1− vI1)
fA(vI1) + fA(1− vI1) (21)
We need to show that this is increasing in vI1. If nA > 1/2, then ρ < 1/2, as we showed in the
previous proof. Hence, −γ(2ρ−1) > 0. It remains to be shown that the last fraction is increasing in
vI1. Intuitively, we need to show that party A is more represented among incumbents that won the
previous election by, for example, 70 to 30%, than among those that won 55 to 45%. Rearranging,
fA(vI1)− fA(1− vI1)




This is increasing in vI1 if and only if
fA(1−vI1)
fA(vI1)
is decreasing in vI1. Given that VA1 is normal






















which is negative for any nA > 1/2.
Appendix B: An Alternative Model
Here we consider a model in which voters do not know the relative strength of parties, but rather
have a prior, which they update with period 1 vote shares. We prove two propositions that are
analogous to Propositions 1 and 2. The only difference is that the results now hold if the prior of
voters is not too far from the true value of nA. In fact, as voters have more an more information on
the strength of parties, i.e. more realizations of the , the prior will converge to the true parameter,
relaxing the conditions on the prior. In the limit, the case considered in here collapses to the one
presented in the main text.
Preferences are like in the model in the main text. However, voters now know σ2 but do not
know nA—they have a prior n
0
prior that is distributed as n
0
prior ∼ N(n0A, σ2,0). For simplicity, we
assume σ2,0 = σ2—this assumption does not affect any of the results.
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Hence, the timing is now as follows:
1. Nature draws 1.
2. Voters vote (t = 1 election).
3. The party that wins the election (that is, obtains more than 1/2 vote share) forms government
and becomes the incumbent.
4. Voters observe the vote shares and update their prior over nA accordingly.
5. Nature draws fire and 2.
7. Voters vote (t = 2 election).
Proposition 3. There exists an equilibrium in which a fire increases the expected incumbent’s vote
share if (n0A ≥ 1/2 and nA > 1/2), or if (n0A ≤ 1/2 and nA < 1/2). If voters do not anticipate the
rally, this equilibrium is unique.
Proof. Period 1 and period 2 with no fire are as in the main text. Now consider t = 2 when there
is a fire. Voters have observed vA1 and update their prior accordingly.
28 Their posterior’s mean






28Note that observing vA1 is equivalent to observing 1. Theoretically, voters could also use the information from 2
to update their prior once more before the t = 2 election. This yields similar results to the ones we present here—in
fact, the conditions on the priors are weaker under this alternative rule of updating, as the prior has less weight. We
abstract from this for simplicity.
With this information, voters estimate the probability that party A wins the election. We study
first the case in which voters do not anticipate the rally.
Case 1. Voters do not anticipate the rally.
Given the posteriors,
V˜A2|VA1 = vA1 ∼ N(n1A(vA1), σ2 + σ2,1)
so the probability of party A winning, as estimated by the voter, is









Plugging into Equation 25,




Hence, the expression for ρ has changed with respect to the main text, as voters are uncertain
about the true nA (we keep the term ρ for simplicity, slightly abusing notation). Instead of a fixed
number, ρ is now a function of vA1.
Vote shares for parties are still given by Equations 11 and 14 and vote shares for the incumbent
by Equations 15 and 16 (with ρ now given by 26).
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The expected effect of a fire on the votes of the incumbent is now given by:
E(δ) ≡ E(VI2|fire = 1)− E(VI2|fire = 0) = −γP (VA1 > 1/2)[E[(2ρ(vA1)− 1)|VA1 > 1/2]
+γP (VA1 < 1/2)[E[(2ρ(vA1)− 1)|VA1 < 1/2]),
where we just have replaced ρ with its new expression.








Consider the case nA > 1/2 (the other is symmetrical). Hence, by assumption of the Proposition,
n0A ≥ 1/2.
Given that ρ(v) is a monotonically decreasing function of v, ρ(v) > ρ(1/2) in the first integral



















Of course, γ > 0. Note that ρ(1/2) < 1/2 because n0A ≥ 1/2. Hence, the second term in 28 is
negative. Finally, the third term is negative because nA > 1/2. Hence, E(δ) > 0.
Case 2. Voters do anticipate the rally.
The estimated vote share for party A in the second period is now given by:
ρ˜(vA1) ≡ P˜ (VA2 < 1/2|fire = 1, VA1 = vA1) = P (Z <
1/2− n0A+vA12 + γ(2ρ˜(vA1)− 1)√
(3/2)σ
). (30)
This provides an equation for ρ˜(vA1). We first prove that a solution exists. Let ρ̂
[0](v) = 0 and
for n = 0, 1, . . .
ρ̂[n+1](v) = P (Z <
1/2− n0A+vA12 + γ(2ρ̂[n](v)− 1)√
(3/2)σ
). (31)
Para each v fixed, by induction, the sequence of real numbers ρ̂[n](v), n = 0, 1, . . ., is monotonically
increasing. Given that there is an upper bound of 1, this sequence has a limit, ρ̂(v). Taking limits
as n → ∞ in 31, the limit ρ̂(v) is a solution to 30. (We cannot rule out that other solutions exist.)
Once we have shown that there is a solution for ρ˜(vA1), the expected effect of a fire on the
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We now show that, as in the no-anticipation case, a) ρ˜(vA1) is monotonically decreasing in vA1,
and b) that ρ˜(1/2) < 1/2.
a) For each n fixed, ρ̂[n](v) is a monotonically decreasing function of v. This is by induction in
n: for n = 0 the function ρ̂[0](v) = 0 is of course (weakly) decreasing and if we assume that ρ̂[n](v)
decreases as v increases, the same happens to ρ̂[n+1](v), according to (31), given that increasing v
decreases
1/2− n0+v2 + γ[2ρ̂[n](v)− 1]
σ
.
Hence, as n → ∞, the limit ρ̂(v) is also a decreasing function.
b) For each n fixed, ρ̂[n](1/2) ≤ 1/2. The proof is by induction, analogous the to the one in
point a). In the limit when n → ∞, also ρ̂(1/2) ≤ 1/2.
With these two results, the proof that E(δ˜) > 0 is identical to the one for E(δ) > 0.
Proposition 4. The effect of a fire on the incumbent’s vote share at t = 2 is increasing in the
incumbent’s vote share at t = 1 if (n0A ≥ 1/2 and nA > 1/2), or if (n0A ≤ 1/2 and nA < 1/2).
Proof. As in the main text, we consider the case in which voters do not anticipate the rally (the
case in which they do is analogous). Consider the case in which nA > 1/2. The case for nA < 1/2
is symmetric.
We want to study how a fire increases the vote share of the incumbent party, for any given
vI1 ≥ 1/2. This is given by this expression:
E(δ|VI1 = vI1) = −γ(2ρ(vI1)− 1)fA(vI1)
fI(vI1)
+ γ(2ρ(1− vI1)− 1)fA(1− vI1)
fI(vI1)
(33)
where fA be the density function of VA1, and fI the density of VI1. As in the main text, we use
the fact that fI(vI1) = fA(vI1) + fA(1− vI1) to have:
E(δ|VI1 = vI1) = −γ(2ρ(vI1)− 1) fA(vI1)
fA(vI1) + fA(1− vI1) + γ(2ρ(1− vI1)− 1)
fA(1− vI1)
fA(vI1) + fA(1− vI1) (34)






















fA(vI1) + fA(1− vI1)
+γ[2ρ(1− vI1)− 1] d
dvI1
fA(1− vI1)









fA(vI1) + fA(1− vI1) ,
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fA(vI1) + fA(1− vI1)
+γ
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fA(vI1) + fA(1− vI1) .
We need to show that this expression is positive.
• First term in the right-hand side. Given that ρ(vI1) is decreasing in vI1, −γ[2ρ(vI1) − 1] is
increasing in vI1 and its derivative is positive. The fraction is also positive.
• Second term. ρ(1− vI1) is increasing in vI1 and hence its derivative is positive. The fraction
is also positive.
• Third term. The derivative is positive, as was proved in the main text. −[2ρ(vI1) − 1] is
negative. We do not know the sign of −[2ρ(1− vI1)− 1] but in any case
−[2ρ(vI1)− 1]− [2ρ(1− vI1)− 1] ≥ 0.
Hence, this term is also positive.
Appendix Figures
Figure A1: Map of Wildfires in Spain
Red dots: municipalities with (at least) one accidental fire larger than 1%, any time.
Blue dots: municipalities with (at least) one accidental fire larger than 1%, 6 months before an
election.
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Figure A2: Effect of a Fire on the Incumbent’s Vote Share, Absolute Size of Fires
(a) By time to election (b) By size of fire
Panel (a): The y-axis shows the point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for βM50, obtained
from ΔIncV oteShareit = αM50,pt+βFireM50,it+ it, for different values of M (x-axis), where S is
now measured in absolute (not per capita) hectares. Panel (b): The y-axis shows the point estimates
and 95% confidence intervals for βS6, obtained from ΔIncV oteShareit = αS6,pt + βFireS6,it + it,
for different values of S (x-axis), where S is now measured in absolute (not per capita) hectares.
Figure A3: Effect of a Fire on the Incumbent’s Vote Share, Size of Fires Relative to Population
(a) By time to election (b) By size of fire
Panel (a): The y-axis shows the point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for βM1, obtained
from ΔIncV oteShareit = αM1,pt + βFireM1,it + it, for different values of M (x-axis), where S is
now measured in hectares per population. Panel (b): The y-axis shows the point estimates and
95% confidence intervals for βS6, obtained from ΔIncV oteShareit = αS6,pt + βFireS6,it + it, for
different values of S (x-axis), where S is now measured in hectares per population.
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Figure A4: Effect of a Fire on the Incumbent’s Vote Share, by Time to Election, Fires of Size S=1%
(Standard Errors Clustered by Province)
The figure shows the effect of a fire burning (at least) 1% of the municipality surface area, by
time to a local election. The y-axis shows the point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for
β1M , obtained from ΔIncV oteShareit = α1M,pt + β1MFire1M,it + 1M,it, for different values of M
(x-axis). The coefficients to the right of the vertical line are placebo tests that show the “effect”
of fires that happen after the election. The standard errors are clustered by province.
Figure A5: Placebo Tests: “Effect” of a Fire on Lagged Incumbent’s Vote Share
(a) By time to election (b) By size of fire
Panel (a): The y-axis shows the point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for βM1, obtained
from ΔIncV oteShareit−4 = αM1,pt + βFireM1,it + it−4, for different values of M (x-axis). Panel
(b): The y-axis shows the point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for βS6, obtained from
ΔIncV oteShareit−4 = αS6,pt + βFireS6,it + it−4, for different values of S (x-axis).
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 46 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1810
Appendix Tables
Table A1: Effects by Strength of the Incumbent, Controling for Population Size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ΔV Inc ΔV Inc ΔV Inc ΔV Inc ΔV Inc ΔV Inc
F ireS,6 1.589 4.848 1.790 4.667* -0.0762 0.711
(2.145) (3.031) (1.640) (2.438) (2.752) (4.654)
FireS,6*Strongz 6.124** 4.188 11.73*** 9.975** 6.068* 8.395
(2.749) (3.786) (3.056) (4.093) (3.191) (5.161)
Size of fire (S) 1% 2% 1% 2% 1% 2%
Strong (z) > 50 > 50 > 75 > 75 > 25 > 25
αpt YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 46877 46877 46877 46877 46877 46877
The table shows the effect of an accidental fire burning (at least) 1% (or 2%) of the mu-
nicipality surface area in the last six months before a local election on the incumbent’s vote
share, by the strength of the incumbent. Each column is obtained from a separate regres-
sion, ΔIncV oteShareit = αS6,pt + βS6FireS6,it + βS6Strongit + βS6FireS6,it ∗ Strongz,it +
ζlog(Population)itS6,it, for S = 1% or S = 2%, as indicated in the “Size of fire” row, and
for z = 50, z = 75, or z = 25, as indicated in the “Strong” row, where z indicates the per-
centile of the incumbent’s vote share in the previous election. Standard errors, clustered by
municipality, are in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
Table A2: National Aid Received by Election Year
2006-2012 2006-2011
Aid Total Aid Aid per Aid Total Aid Aid per
Indicator Hectare Indicator Hectare
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Election Year -0.068∗∗∗ -0.628∗ 0.187 -0.033∗ -1.168∗∗ -0.604
(0.019) (0.369) (0.826) (0.018) (0.490) (0.933)
Constant 0.091∗∗∗ 8.627∗∗∗ 2.016∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 9.167∗∗∗ 2.807∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.249) (0.295) (0.013) (0.401) (0.490)
N 586 44 44 441 20 20
The table shows the effect of being in a local election-year on the national aid received after a fire. The
specification is the following yit = α+β Election Yeart+ it, the sample being composed of municipality-
fires if the affected area was at least 1% of the municipality’s surface area. yit in columns 1 and 3 is a
dummy taking value 1 if the municipality received national aid associated to the fire. In columns 2 and 4
the dependent variable is the log (real) aid received, while in columns 3 and 5 it is the log aid per hectare
burnt. The covariate Election Year is a dummy taking value 1 if the fire was detected within a local
election year and zero otherwise. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05,
*p < 0.1.
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Table A3: Effect of a Fire on Land Rezoning
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fire1,6 -0.00171 -0.0218 0.0115
(0.0145) (0.0157) (0.0281)
Fire2,6 0.00203 -0.0176 -0.00339
(0.0227) (0.0219) (0.0346)
Years after the election 1 2 5 1 2 5
αpt YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 37686 37686 37689 37686 37686 37689
The table shows the effect of an accidental fire burning (at least) 1% (or 2%, in the second row) of the
municipality surface area in the last 6 months before a local election on the difference of the munici-
pality surface area that is considered as “urban” or “developable” between the years indicated in the
“years after the election” row and the election-year. Each column is obtained from a separate regression,
UrbanSurfaceit+j − UrbanSurfaceit = αS6,pt + ζS6FireS6,it + θS6,it,, for S = 1% or S = 2%, and for
j = 1, j = 2, or j = 5, as indicated in the “Years after the election” row. Standard errors, clustered by
municipality, are in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
Table A4: Effect of a Fire on Unemployment and Population Size
Panel A: Effect on Unemployment Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fire1,6 -0.0290 -0.0836 0.107
(0.124) (0.169) (0.211)
Fire2,6 -0.0946 0.231 -0.228
(0.149) (0.192) (0.271)
Years after the fire 1 2 5 1 2 5
αpt YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 40043 32241 32223 40043 32241 32223
Panel B: Effect on Population Size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fire1,6 0.000454 -0.00448 -0.0154
(0.00484) (0.00727) (0.0115)
Fire2,6 0.000299 -0.00198 -0.0425***
(0.00722) (0.0113) (0.0149)
Years after the fire 1 2 5 1 2 5
αpt YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 56163 48357 48085 56163 48357 48085
Panel A shows the effect of an accidental fire burning (at least) 1% (or 2%, in the second row) of the
municipality surface area in the last 6 months before a local election on the change in unemployment rate
between the election year and the years indicated in the “years after the election” row. Each column is
obtained from a separate regression, UnemRatei,t+j − UnemRatei,t = αS6,pt + ζS6FireS6,it + θS6,it, for
S = 1% or S = 2%, and for j = 1, j = 2, or j = 5, as indicated in the “Years after the election” row.
Standard errors, clustered by municipality, are in parentheses. Panel B is analogous, for population size
instead of unemployment rate. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Table A5: Effects by Party
Panel A: Effect of a Fire on Parties’ Vote Shares
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fire1,6 4.230*** 1.663 1.503
(1.449) (1.335) (1.566)
Fire2,6 7.069*** 1.470 -0.349
(2.140) (1.836) (2.096)
Effect on Incumbent PP PSOE Incumbent PP PSOE
αpt YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 46877 42958 42772 46877 42958 42772
Panel B: Effect of a Fire on the Incumbent’s Vote Share by Party
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fire1,6 4.230*** 3.667** 4.183*
(1.449) (1.786) (2.316)
Fire2,6 7.069*** 5.641*** 7.504*
(2.140) (2.089) (4.059)
Incumbent All PP PSOE All PP PSOE
αpt YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 46877 17259 15903 46877 17259 15903
Panel A shows the effect of an accidental fire burning (at least) 1% (or 2%, on the second
row) of the municipality surface area in the last six months before a local election on the
incumbent’s vote share (Columns 1 and 4), PP vote share (Columns 2 and 5) and PSOE vote
share (Columns 3 and 6). Each column is obtained from a separate regression, ΔOutcomeit =
αS6,pt + βS6FireS6,it + S6,it, where the outcome is the incumbent’s vote share, the PP vote
share, or the PSOE vote share. Panel B shows the effect of an accidental fire burning (at least)
1% (or 2%, on the second row) of the municipality surface area in the last six months before a
local election on the incumbent’s vote share, with the whole sample (Columns 1 and 4), only PP
incumbents (Columns 2 and 5), and only PSOE incumbents (Columns 3 and 6). Each column
is obtained from a separate regression, ΔIncV oteShareit = αS6,pt + βS6FireS6,it + S6,it.
Standard errors, clustered by municipality, are in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05,
*p < 0.1.
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Table A6: Effects by Alignment
Panel A: Effect of a Fire on the Aligned Party’s Vote Shares
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fire1,6 4.230*** 2.327 1.666
(1.449) (1.565) (1.444)
Fire2,6 7.069*** 2.211 2.310
(2.140) (1.893) (2.037)
Effect on Inc. Aligned w. Aligned w. Inc. Aligned w. Aligned w.
reg. gov. nat. gov. reg. gov. nat. gov.
αpt YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 46877 44849 43701 46877 44849 43701
Panel B: Effect of a Fire on the Incumbent’s Vote Share by Alignment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fire1,6 4.230*** 3.707** 3.810
(1.449) (1.566) (2.749)
Fire2,6 7.069*** 6.165*** 8.179*
(2.140) (2.340) (4.368)
Incumbent All Aligned w. Aligned w. All Aligned w. Aligned w.
reg. gov. nat. gov. reg. gov. nat. gov.
YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 46877 24931 17734 46877 24931 17734
Panel A shows the effect of an accidental fire burning (at least) 1% (or 2%, on the second row) of the
municipality surface area in the last six months before a local election on the incumbent’s vote share
(Columns 1 and 4), the party that is aligned with the regional government (Columns 2 and 5), and
the party that is aligned with the national government (Columns 3 and 6). Each column is obtained
from a separate regression, ΔOutcomeit = αS6,pt + βS6FireS6,it + S6,it, where the outcome is the
incumbent’s vote share, the party aligned with the regional government, or the party aligned with
the national government. Panel B shows the effect of an accidental fire burning (at least) 1% (or
2%, on the second row) of the municipality surface area in the last six months before a local election
on the incumbent’s vote share, with the whole sample (Columns 1 and 4), only incumbents that are
aligned with the regional government (Columns 2 and 5), and only incumbents that are aligned with
the national government (Columns 3 and 6). Each column is obtained from a separate regression,
ΔIncV oteShareit = αS6,pt+βS6FireS6,it+ S6,it. Standard errors, clustered by municipality, are in
parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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